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CHA .. et:A5 OF 
SANORA OAY O'CONNOR 
.tl1qn~nu GJou.ri gf lJt6 ~b ~talt.8' 
:..ul{iqton. ~. OJ. 20~,., 
October 21, 1985 
No. 85-214 Delaware v. Pensterer 
Dear John, 
You describe Agent Robillard's testimony as involving 
"an implied prior representation of which the declarant 
disclaims present knowledge,• on the grounds that his 
qualification as an expert implied that "he had a valid 
reason for reaching that conclusion at the time of his 
investigation.• But the question reserved in Green involved 
an express prior representation specifically introduced by 
the prosecution as substantive evidence. I see nothing in 
our cases that would justify embarking on the difficult and 
questionable enterprise of deciding when there has been an 
implied representation. In any event, in this case, Agent 
Robillard openly admitted at voir dire that he could not 
recall which reason was the basis for his conclusion. App. 
to Brief in Opposition A-1-A-2. That admission would seem 
to preclude finding any implied representation. Thus, 
unless the Confrontation Clause required the trial court to 
refuse to qualify Robillard as an expert witness because of 
his lapse of memory, your analysis would not affect the 
resolution of this case. 
I think it clear that allowing Robillard to qualify as 
an expert witness did not offend the Confrontation Clause. 
The defense did not object to his qualification on these 
grounds, instead urging that Robillard's adoption of the 
follicular tag theory should disqualify him. App. to Brief 
in Opposition A-8. Even if the defense had objected, I 
continue to believe, for the reasons stated in the 
circulating draft, that the Confrontation Clause does not 
forbid the admission of an otherwise qualified expert's 
opinion, arrived at through his ordinary testing processes, 
solely because he is unable to recall which of the test 
results was •positive.• 
You also suggest that because this case would present a 
situation analogous to Green had the prosecution introduced 
Dr• DeForest's testimony as to Robillard's out-of-court 
statement, we should not rely on this testimony to conclude 
that the admission of Robillard's opinion did not deny 
respondent a fair trial. I disagree. Given that the 
admission of Robillard's opinion did not violate the 
confrontation Clause, there is no basis for holding the 
state responsible for the introduction of Dr. DeForest's 
testimony, which defense counsel deliberately chose to 
elicit. Even were we to assume that the state could somehow 
be held responsible as a matter of due process, I would not 
then leap back to the Confrontation Clause and reach the 
Green question: I would ask whether the defendant might have 
been denied a fair trial. In fact Dr. DeForest's testimony 
accomplished precisely what the defense hoped--it put before 
the jury the acknowledgment that Robillard said he could not 
make, and heightened the usefulness to the defense of Dr. 
DeForest's attack on the validity of the follicular tag 
theory. It also tended to call into question the 
truthfulness of Robillard's professed lapse of memory. 
under these circumstances, it seems to me proper both to 
suggest that due process may have a role to play in 
situations to which the Confrontation Clause does not speak 
and to explain why that possibility does not help 
respondent's cause. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
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